

On Pollockism

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ABSTRACT

In this paper, we deal with a Purva paksha on Prof. Sheldon Pollock's methodologies and paradigm. We begin with an introduction to "Tools for Thought", the concepts from Marxism, Critical Theory, and Philology needed as a prerequisite. Then we explore the uses and abuses of philology and examine the applicability of the 'Vico-Spinoza-Marx-Critical Theory-Philology Project-Paradigm' in relation to Indian texts and Scriptures and suggest some way forward to correct the situation.

Keywords: Critical Theory, Marx, dialectical, materialistic, Philology, Vico, Spinoza, Hegel, Hume, Coomaraswamy, gesture, mirror, imagination, emancipation, contradictions, poststructuralism, Derrida, deconstruction, Foucault, Mahabharata, hierarchization, aestheticization, Sheldon Pollock, Jan Gonda, rationality, idealism, Theory, practice, criticism, literary, transcendental, Sanskrit, *pāramārthika*, *kāma*, *puruṣārtha*, *mokṣa*, *vyāvahārika*, *ākālika*, *alārṅkāra*, *mīmāṃsā*, *Vedānta*, ,

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1.0.0. Introduction

During recent decades a lot of writings, diametrically opposed to our traditional view, have come from the West declaring Sanskrit writings devoid of any spirituality, full of internal contradictions, divisive, and above all created for power-culture manipulations, and hence oppressive, immoral and socially toxic. The serious issues raised in 'The Battle for Sanskrit', [Malhotra. 2016] have made it necessary to make a careful and critical scrutiny in the foundations and ideological paradigm underlying the writings of Prof. Sheldon Pollock.

While keeping our approach objective and unprejudiced, we base our exploration on an assumption on Prof. Sheldon Pollock. The assumption is that "Prof. Sheldon Pollock speaks and writes what he thinks". Then we consider what he says in his "Towards a Political philology..." [Pollock, 2008, 52]. Pollock says, "... it may not always be possible to draw a perfectly straight line between a philological method and a 'critical theory' of culture and power..." [Pollock, 2008, 52].

We notice, [Sati Shankar, 2016, a], that, in the post-structuralist phase of the Critical Theory, Michel Foucault [Foucault, 1979], observed that in the Western societies, 'the social power may get mediated through philosophy.' In addition, he described the way in which, 'the latent struggle between the social authority and individual reason can turn the reason into a battleground.' It seems Sheldon Pollock, known to be the leader of such Philological exercises, applied the same to the Indian tradition, assuming that the same Foucauldian process might have taken place in the Indian intellectual tradition and in the field of ideas. He considered Sanskrit and Sanskrit texts as a mediator to the authority, who prescribed action and thereby acting as a bearer of prescriptions into the lives, and onto the bodies, of those who enacted the Indian philosophies of law, *Nāṭya*, dance etc. Based on that Pollock writes, "Voluntaristic vernacularism' and 'non-coercive cosmopolitanism', along with 'transcendental Paradigmatism' and 'argumentative pluralism', will convince some that Macaulay was right when he declared India to be the 'strangest of all possible anomalies.'" [Pollock, 2015, d]. However, we find that the conclusion so reached by Pollock is not solely due to Foucauldian, which provides a meta-frame for Pollock's philological ventures; but his analytics rests on the other analytics of the Critical Theory also. Though we call it the Critical theory, but as we shall see below, there is not a single general Critical theory but a bundle of mutually inclusive as well as exclusive theories, which are chosen and combined together differently from case to case. In short, we can say, there is no "unique", Critical theory. In addition, there is something more behind the curtain, which we shall see this paper below.

Every civilization has developed ways of interpreting the texts that it produces. We know that our own tradition has been welcoming whatever propositions, but has never accepted any idea unless it passed through rigorous tests, through logic, arguments, and 'inner' experience, [Gopal, R. 1983]. The viewpoint has always been of the "cosmic whole". Everyone is bound by certain presuppositions, knowingly or unknowingly, determined by his or her own socio-cultural background and the tradition he or she belongs to unless his tradition itself warns him to liberate himself from such strings. Fortunately, our Indian tradition directs to lift oneself to a state of absolute indifference, [Sati Shankar, 2015]. Many of the mistakes are committed when we continue using mindlessly some Paradigm or methodology without really knowing if it is applicable to the subject under consideration. Every method depends on certain

assumptions and success or failure of the method depends on whether foundational assumptions are satisfied or not.

As this paper is for *Purva paksha* we explore the foundations of Pollock's analytics, the "Critical Theory - Philology Project - Paradigm. Every method or technique has two dimensions, of use and of misuse. Examples from the deconstruction of a "philological project" considered below show how methodologies are abused. We find the causes limiting the Paradigm and modifications are proposed to widen the foundational assumptions to enhance its applicability and hence to assimilate within the paradigm, the "vital aspect" (cf. 4.0.0. and 5.0.0.), which has been assumed away so far. This dismissal of a vital aspect of our traditional paradigm may be due to conceptual handicap, technical limitation or lack of tractability or to the dominance of the leftist ideology or a combination of all these. Examination of these may be undertaken, as challenging research projects, both, by Indian and/or the Western scholars since it would lead to methodological innovation.

The overall nature of this paper is expository for the *Purva paksha* of Prof. Pollock's methodological paradigm; hence, we will focus on the foundations of the paradigm. To make it self-contained, we make a "selective" survey of prerequisites, the essential ideas of Marx, and the Critical theory in section (2.0.0.) under the head, 'Tools for thought'. Conceptually we move along a path, 'Vico-Spinoza-Marx-Critical Theory-Philology Project-Paradigm' keeping in mind that Prof. Pollock's field of operation is ultimately Philology and the Sanskrit Knowledge System, SKS. It is a varied, pluralistic, multidisciplinary, and theoretically "non-unique" paradigm. *Purva paksha* in methodologies involves cross-referencing of ideas and definitions and therefore, each idea of 'significance' is numbered and referred in the text to, wherever it is needed. In Section (4.0.0.), we consider briefly Pollock's methodologies, Philology, and others, but neither historically nor theoretically but practically, to have an experience of its use and abuse. In Section (5.0.0.), we evaluate if the current "Critical Theory-Philology Paradigm" is applicable to our Sanskrit literature in general and Scriptures in Sanskrit and other Indian languages in particular. Beyond that, rest is the application of the methodologies under the paradigm.

2.0.0. Tools for thought

In this section, we aim to familiarize ourselves with the ideas, which are prerequisite. Prof. Pollock, while repeatedly referring to philology as his principal methodology, keeps the Critical Theory, in the background. Moreover, in his writings, one rarely finds a direct reference or keywords related to it. Therefore, to understand the paradigm working behind his analytics, it is necessary to have an understanding of the fundamentals of the Critical theory along with the philology. In the absence of these, chances are that Pollock and his academic children and grandchildren and will go on producing the literature under the same paradigm and we, ignorant of the intrinsic conclusion of the paradigm, go on correcting them indefinitely. I agree with Grünendahl when he says, "... it would be futile to exhaust oneself in the tedious correction of factual errors and distortions, because the postcolonial charge gathers its momentum outside the sphere of prosaic factuality, preferably by means of subtle insinuation", [Grünendahl, 2010]. It is common knowledge in scientific researches that to break a paradigm one needs to hit to the foundations.

The same applies to the "object of study" also; here it is Sanskrit and Sanskrit literature. Not only the texts and its history of production, in which Pollock has been interested to find some 'sense' supporting his power-culture conclusions but also the ideas and knowledge the texts carry. It must be taken here as a caution that absence of basic and correct understanding of texts and ideas therein as per our own tradition, would certainly lead to the similar disaster as we expect in the absence of basic understanding of methodologies. The requisite combination of the above two is indeed, tricky and scarce.

If one wants to conduct a critical analysis ..., one requires a critical philosophy as a foundation. The most important critical philosophy tradition is the one that goes back to Hegel and Marx. [Fuchs, 2015, 12]. However, before that, we need to be familiar with Giambattista Vico, whose theory lies at the heart of the Marxism and the Western Critical theory and hence, philology.

2.1.0 Giambattista Vico: The Verum-Factum and Verum-Certum Principles

'It is said that Giambattista Vico, and not Spinoza, was the first Marxist before Marx. He anticipated anticolonial liberation Theory, and he spoke directly to while giving us weapons against, the post-humanism of internet culture.' [Brennan, 2013]. Vico inspired Marx, besides many others with his three stage in humanity, 'divine-heroic-human', as envisaged by the poets, whom he considered to be the "creators"; this is not unlike the role of *kavis*, in our own tradition, [Coomaraswamy, 1994, 98, fn. 97].

2.1.1. To see the first steps in Vico's writings, it is necessary to consider four basic rules concerning the acceptability of knowledge as given by René Descartes. The rules were: (1). 'never to accept anything for true not clearly known to be such.' (2) 'To divide difficulties examined into as many parts as possible.' (3) 'Start with the simplest and easiest, ascend to the more complex, pay attention to the asymmetric relation of antecedence and sequence' and (4) 'make enumerations and reviews to assure that nothing was omitted,' [Descartes, 1637]. Vico criticized Descartes for reflecting only on nature's empirical reality and not on human ability to 'create' new realities.' Vico gave the *verum-factum* principle and the ideal eternal history, his two most famous ideas. According to the *verum-factum* principle, one can know the truth in what one makes. According to Vico, 'because God made the natural world, only God can know it. Humans can understand the human world because humans made it. This became the foundation for a 'New Science', [Vico, 1948/1744]. Vico gave another justification against Descartes' famous "I think, therefore I am". According to Vico, this statement was to provide a "first principle" that refutes skepticism, but it did not address entirely the challenge of the skeptics. A skeptic knows that he or she exists. However, he or she 'does not know anything significant about his existence, because the 'cause of his or her ideas' remains unknown. This presented a serious challenge to Cartesianism. 'The *verum-factum* principle claimed to solve the skeptic's problem by explaining that since "we are the cause of what we make, we can know what was made". Thus, the skeptic, who claims, "knowledge is impossible", is incorrect. For Vico, making something becomes the criteria for knowing the truth about it.' In his later writings, however, Vico holds that 'through the world, humans make (and so they know it), humans can also witness "eternal truth" such as the "ideal eternal history" and the *verum-factum* principle itself.' Vico suggested that the *verum-factum* principle ought to be read in conjunction with the *verum-certum* principle outlined in the 'Universal Law'. According to Vico, 'we begin with certum, acquaintance with and beliefs about particular matters of fact, which is a precondition of all thoughts and actions and is capable of attaining *verum*, knowledge of 'universal truths.'

2.2.0. Marxist Dialectical and Historical Materialism

Now some basics from Marxism .Our conceptual summary in Marxism is based on the "Dialectical and Historical Materialism", by J.V. Stalin, [Stalin. 1938]. All direct or indirect quotes are from the same source unless stated otherwise, and paper can be referred to for further details.

2.2..1.' "Dialectics" comes from the Greek, *dialego*, to discourse, to debate, the 'art of arriving at the truth by disclosing the "contradictions" in the argument of an opponent and overcoming these contradictions with a presumption that it would lead to the truth'. In Marxism "contradiction" lies at the core, see (cf. 2.2.10.4; 2.2.10.5.).

2.2.2. 'Dialectical materialism is an approach which presupposes that the method of studying and apprehending the phenomena of nature is "dialectical" while its interpretation of the phenomena of nature, its conception, its theory, are necessarily materialistic.'

2.2.3. To establish the 'dialectical method, Marx adopted Hegel's philosophy, of whose main feature has been dialectical, but took its "rational kernel" only and left the "idealistic" part and developed dialectics with rational kernel further so as to lend it a modern scientific form.

2.2.4. 'To describe materialism, Marx usually refers to Feuerbach as the philosopher who restored materialism, but took only the "inner kernel", from Feuerbach's materialism, and developed it into a scientific-philosophical theory of materialism, and leaves "its idealistic and religious-ethical encumbrances".

2.2.5. This dialectical method of thought was later extended to the phenomena of nature, presupposed to be in constant movement and undergoing constant change, and that it develops because of 'inherent contradictions' in nature, as the result of the interaction of opposed forces in nature.

2.2.6. 'Historical materialism is an application of the principles of dialectical materialism to the phenomena of the life of society, to the study of society and of its history, (In its broadest sense). In its essence, dialectics is the direct opposite of metaphysics and explores dynamic changes, i.e., changes through time and contradictions.'

2.2.7. Thus, Marx's Dialectical theory had,

- (i) From Hegel-Marx accepted "Rational Kernel" (materialistic part) and excluded ('idealistic part')
- (ii) From Feuerbach, he accepts "Inner Kernel" (materialistic part), and excluding (Idealistic and religious-ethical encumbrances)

2.2.8. The essence of historical materialism is beautifully presented by none other than Karl Marx himself, in 1859 in his historic Preface to his famous book, 'A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy' as:

"In the social production of their life, men enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will, relations of production which correspond to a definite stage of development of their material productive forces. The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which rises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the social, political, and intellectual life process in general. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness. At a certain stage of their development, the material productive forces of society come into conflict with the existing relations of production, or – what is but a legal expression for the same thing – with the property relations within which they have been at work hitherto. From forms of development of the productive forces, these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an epoch of social revolution. With the change of the economic foundation, the entire immense superstructure is more or less rapidly transformed. In considering such transformations a distinction should always be made between the material transformation of the economic conditions of production, which can be determined with the precision of natural science, and the legal, political, religious, aesthetic or philosophic – in short, ideological forms in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out. Just as our opinion of an individual is not based on what he thinks of himself, so can we not judge of such a period of transformation by its own consciousness; on the contrary this consciousness must be explained rather from the contradictions of material life, from the existing conflict between the social productive forces and the relations of production. No social order ever perishes before all the productive forces for which there is room in it have developed, and new, higher relations of production never appear before the material conditions of their existence have matured in the womb of the old society itself. Therefore mankind always sets itself only such tasks as it can solve; since looking at the matter more closely, it will always be found that the task itself arises only when the material conditions for its solution already exist or are at least in the process of formation." (Marx, Selected Works, Vol. I, pp. 269-70.), quoted in J.V. Stalin, [Stalin. 1938].

2.2.9. There are three principal methods of Marxism. (1) Dialectical Method, (*Contrary to Metaphysics*), (2) Philosophical Materialism, (*Contrary to Idealism*) and (3) Historical Materialism. All of these are

interconnected in characteristics, by causations and contradictions between forces of production. The salient features of which can be summarized [Stalin, 1938], as follows,

2.2.10.0 Marxist Dialectical Method: *Contrary to Metaphysics*

2.2.10.1. *Contrary to Metaphysics*, 'Nature is Connected and Deterministic: "Any" phenomenon can be understood and explained if considered in its inseparable connection with surrounding phenomena, as one conditioned by surrounding phenomena.'

2.2.10.2. *Contrary to Metaphysics*, 'Nature is in a State of Continuous Motion and Change, i.e., dynamic: "Phenomena should be considered not only from the standpoint of their interconnection and interdependence in nature but also from the standpoint of their movement, their change, their development, their coming into being and going out of being."

2.2.10.3. *Contrary to Metaphysics*, 'Natural Quantitative Change Leads to Qualitative Change: Dialectics " holds that the process of development should be understood not as movement in a circle, not as a simple repetition of what has already occurred, but as an onward and upward movement, as a transition from an old qualitative state to a new qualitative state, as a development from the simple to the complex, from the lower to the higher."

2.2.10.4 The role of *contradictions* in Marxist process was put on a pedestal by Mao Zedong (also pronounced as Mao Tse Tung) in his article "On Contradictions", [Zedong. 1937, 1937, and b]. 'Contradictions' as states of affair lie at the heart of the whole Marxism and its subsequent developments and have significant applications to critical theories, to be seen in the next section. A summary of Marx's use of dialectical concepts, including contradiction, opposition, organic relation or system, moment, dominant moment, qualitative change, and related concepts can also be found in [Sati Shankar, 2015,a].

Contradictions Inherent in Nature : *Contrary to Metaphysics*, "Dialectics holds that internal contradictions are inherent in all things and phenomena of nature, for they all have their negative and positive sides, the past and a future, something dying away and something developing; and that the struggle between these opposites, the struggle between the old and the new, between that which is dying away and that which is being born, between that which is disappearing and that which is developing, constitutes the internal content of the process of development, the internal content of the transformation of quantitative changes into qualitative changes." (Cf.2.2.0. to 2.3.0.).

2.2.10.5. One interesting fact with the analytics of 'contradictions' is that Marxism does not attempt to eliminate these contradictions but leaves them to fight and let some result come up by itself. Interestingly, when the result is reached, the theory of contradiction remains in action to analyze and find out further hidden contradictions and again to leave then to decide by themselves and the process continues, for details [Habib, 2010]. Its direct effect can be seen in writings under Marxist and Critical theory paradigms, as introduced in the next section.

2.2.11.0 Marxist Philosophical Materialism: *Contrary to idealism*

After Giambattista Vico, [Vico, G.1948/1744], Marxist Philosophical Materialism comes as the second most significant to the foundations of Critical Analysis followed by Philology.

2.2.11.1.. Materialist: *Contrary to idealism*, "Marx's philosophical materialism holds that the world is by its very nature material, (cf.2.2.4), that the manifold phenomena of the world constitute different forms of matter in motion, that interconnection and interdependence of phenomena, (cf. 2.2.10.1), as established by the dialectical method, (cf. 2.2.5), are a law of the development of moving matter, and that the world develops in accordance with the laws of movement of matter and stands in no need of a "universal spirit."

2.2.11.2. Objective Reality : "*Contrary to idealism*, which asserts that only our consciousness really exists, and that the material world, being, nature, exists only in our consciousness' in our sensations, ideas, and perceptions, the Marxist philosophical materialism holds that matter, nature, being, is an objective reality existing outside and independent of our consciousness; that matter is primary, since it is the source of sensations, ideas, consciousness, and that consciousness is secondary, derivative, since it is a reflection of matter, a reflection of being; that thought is a product of matter which in its development has

reached a high degree of perfection, namely, of the brain, and the brain is the organ of thought; and that, therefore, one cannot separate thought from matter without committing a grave error."

2.2.11.3. *Contrary to idealism*, "The question of the relation of thinking to being, the relation of spirit to nature is the paramount question of the whole of philosophy... The answers, which the philosophers gave to this question, split them into two great camps. Those who asserted the primacy of spirit to nature ... comprised the camp of idealism. The others, who regarded nature as primary, belong to the various schools of materialism." (Marx, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, p. 329.) Quoted in [Stalin. 1938].

2.2.11.4. Marx says, "The material, sensuously perceptible world to which we ourselves belong is the only reality... Our consciousness and thinking, however, supra-sensuous they may seem, are the product of a material, bodily organ, the brain. The matter is not a product of the mind, but the mind itself is merely the highest product of matter." quoted in [Stalin. 1938].

2.2.11.5. "The world picture is a picture of how matter moves and of how 'matter thinks.'"

2.2.11.6. "The brain is the organ of thought."

2.2.11.7. *The World and Its Laws Are Knowable*: "*Contrary to idealism*, which denies the possibility of knowing the world and its laws, which does not believe in the authenticity of our knowledge, does not recognize objective truth, and holds that the world is full of "things-in-themselves" that can never be known to science, Marxist philosophical materialism holds that the world and its laws are fully knowable, that our knowledge of the laws of nature, tested by experiment and practice, is authentic knowledge having the validity of objective truth, and that there are no things in the world which are unknowable, but only things which are as yet not known, but which will be disclosed and made known by the efforts of science and practice."

2.2.11.8. "If the connection between the phenomena of nature and their interdependence are laws of the development of nature, it follows, too, that the connection and interdependence of the phenomena of social life are laws of the development of society, and not something accidental."

2.2.11.9. "Hence, social life, the history of society, ceases to be an agglomeration of "accidents", for, the history of society becomes a development of society according to regular laws, and the study of the history of society becomes a science."

2.2.11.10. "Hence, the science of the history of society, despite all the complexity of the phenomena of social life, can become as precise a science as, let us say, biology, and capable of making use of the laws of development of society for practical purposes."

2.2.11.11. "If nature, being, the material world, is primary, and consciousness, thought, is secondary, derivative; if the material world represents objective reality existing independently of the consciousness of men, while consciousness is a reflection of this objective reality, it follows that the material life of society, its being, is also primary, and its spiritual life secondary, derivative, and that the material life of society is an objective reality existing independently of the will of men, while the spiritual life of society is a reflection of this objective reality, a reflection of being."

2.2.11.12. "Hence, the source of formation of the spiritual life of society, the origin of social ideas, social theories, political views and political institutions, should not be sought for in the ideas, theories, views and political institutions themselves, but in the conditions of the material life of society, in social being, of which these ideas, theories, views, etc., are the reflection."

2.2.11.13. "Hence, if in different periods of the history of society different social ideas, theories, views and political institutions are to be observed; if under the slave system we encounter certain social ideas, theories, views and political institutions, under feudalism others, and under capitalism others still, this is not to be explained by the "nature", the "properties" of the ideas, theories, views and political institutions themselves but by the different conditions of the material life of society at different periods of social development."

2.2.11.14. "Whatever is the being of a society, whatever are the conditions of material life of a society, and such are the ideas, theories political views and political institutions of that society."

2.2.11.15. "Theory becomes a material force as soon as it has gripped the masses." (Marx and Engels, Vol. I, p. 406.) Quoted in [Stalin. 1938].

2.2.12.0 Historical Materialism.

"In production," Marx says", men not only act on nature but also on one another. They produce only by co-operating in a certain way and mutually exchanging their activities. In order to produce, they enter into definite connections and relations with one another and only within these social connections and relations does their action on nature, does production, take place." (Marx and Engels, Vol. V, p. 429.)" Quoted in [Stalin, 1938]. We can see the influence of these developments on later developments of critical theories and the "Liberation Theology," [Löwy, 2006], which formed a basic analogy for Pollock to conjure what he refers to as the "Liberation Philology," [Pollock, 2012, 2009], (cf. 3.4.0). We end this summary here with essentials of Marxism needed initially for the conceptual understanding of The Critical Theory and beyond to be seen in the next section.

2.2.13.0. How Marxists view Literature

2.2.13.1. For evaluation of literature, Marxists follow Engels' lead. Engels said on Goethe,

"We criticize him not from a moral or from a Party point of view, but at the very most from the aesthetic and historical point of view; we measure Goethe neither by moral nor by political, nor by 'human' standards" [Marx & Engels 1976, 356],

2.2.13.2. What he wrote to Ferdinand Lassalle for play, Franz von Sickingen:

"You see that I make very high, that is to say, the very highest demands on your work both from the aesthetic and historical points of view ..." [Marx & Engels 1976, 107].

2.2.14.0. Thus, we find dual yardsticks around which Marxian analysis revolves.

- (i) Aesthetics and Form and
- (ii) Historicity.

2.3.0. Critical Theory

The term "Critical Theory, was in fact, used as a camouflage by the Marxist theorists of famous Frankfurt Institute of Germany, who ran away, after the Nazi's intervention, to take exile in Columbia University, New York, the United States, which is by chance, the base of Pollock also. Critical Theory is an approach which studies society under Marxist-dialectical-historical-materialism, (cf. 2.2.1 to 2.2.11.15), by analyzing the political economy, domination, contradiction, exploitation, and ideologies. A "normative approach" considers "domination, or "hierarchization", as a problem and aims at a society, which is free from domination attained through the political struggles with leftist ideology. Later developments in the Critical theory, however, made many reconstructions. It provided ground for the "binary" principle in the structuralism of Lavi Strauss and at the poststructuralist stage, to the deconstruction of Derrida, Foucauldian, and Rorty, to name a few prominent figures. We find Marxist critiques, increasingly superseded by strictly immanent critiques, oriented to identity politics and local reforms. In recent years, Postmodernism has been challenged by various approaches that show a new focus on transcendental notions of Marxist critique: trans-factuality, trans-critique, or the trans-empirical etc., but being specialized topics is beyond the scope of this paper on *Purva paksha*.

'If one wants to conduct a critical analysis of..., one requires a critical philosophy as a foundation. The most important critical philosophy tradition is the one that goes back to Hegel and Marx.' [Fuchs, 2015, 12]. Summaries in Sections (cf. 2.3.1, 2.3.2., and 2.3.3.) below are based on [Corradetti, 2016] and sections (2.3.4. and 2.3.5) are based on [Kellner, 2016]. All quotes, direct or indirect, are from the same respective source unless stated otherwise, and can be referred to for further details.

2.3.1. Traditional and Critical Theory: Ideology and Critique

To Karl Popper, critique is an epistemological method that shows logical contradictions whereas, to Theodor W. Adorno contradictions are not only epistemological but can be inherent in objects themselves so that they cannot be resolved by acquiring new knowledge. (cf. 2.1.1.). Popper can be considered as a representative of traditional theory because he sees critique and truth as individual and subjective

concepts. Traditional theory, be it deductive or analytical, it explains facts through the application of laws presumed to be universal.' A self-evident proposition or truth forms the foundation stone and empirical verification is necessary.

'Here the basic tenet that works is that knowledge of the phenomenal world is simply a "mirror of reality", (cf.2.2.11.2; 2.2.11.4; 2.2.11.5), which the Critical Theory firmly rejects. The overconfidence of Ludwig Wittgenstein in logic, [Wittgenstein, 1961], was later shaken as we find the contrary in his *Philosophical Investigations*, [Wittgenstein, 1953]. A logical proposition shows a 'possibility' which may either be true or false. It implies that the condition of truth and falsehood presupposes an objective structure of the world. Critical theory rejected such objectivity with the plea that objects of knowledge, itself is 'embedded into a historical and social process. (cf. 2.2.11.2; 2.2.11.4; and 2.2.11.7 to 2.2.11.10).

2.3.1.1. Horkheimer writes, "The facts which our sense present to us are socially performed in two ways: through the historical character of the object perceived and through the historical character of the perceiving organ" [Horkheimer, 1937], in [Ingram and Simon-Ingram 1992, p. 242]. He says, 'objectivity is a myth,' because it depends on technological conditions which in turn, is sensitive to the material condition of production, (cf. 2.2.11.1. to 2.2.11.6. and 2.2.12.0.).

2.3.1.2. 'Critical theory abandons the 'idealistic' naive conception of knowledge.' because the intellectuals are part of this world and are not external observers, the knowledge they obtain is from the social system itself due to interdependence, (cf. 2.1.1.; 2.2.11.2 to 2.2.11.6). This gives us the first signature behind the failure of Critical theory, initial or developed, to cope partially with the Indian Sanskrit Knowledge system. In addition, this gives us the first signal on a possible methodological modification to be able to deal with both, the Indian knowledge system and the Critical reasoning of the West.

2.3.1.3. "Knowledge as "mirror of reality" is considered as in Marxism, (cf.2.2.11.7.to 2.2.11.15.), is considered to be unsatisfactory and mere a theoretical proposition.

2.3.1.4. To Critical Theory, knowledge is social criticism, which, in turn, translates itself into social action, which in turn, transforms itself into reality, (cf. 2.2.11.8 to 2.2.11.15)

2.3.1.5. Critical Theory has been strongly influenced by Hegel's theory of dialectic, as followed by Karl Marx, which aimed to reconcile socio-historical contradictions, (cf. 2.2.11.4.), Marx's theory of economy and society, and Hegel's bourgeois philosophy. (cf. 2.2.3; 2.2.4. and 2.2.7.)

2.3.1.6. Like Marx, "Critical Theory rejects Hegel's metaphysical apparatus and also 'eschatological' aspect of Marx's theory and analyses and aims to the open system of analysis based on 'immanent form of social criticism". (cf.2.2.7.)

2.3.1.7. By expanding Marx's theory of economy and society, the Critical Theory has formulated 'social emancipatory strategies'. (Cf.2.2.11.10 to 2.2.11.13)

2.3.1.8. The critical theory started with Marxian belief and ideology along with production, summarizes [Corradetti, 2016], "which according to Marx, was totally explicable through the underlying system of production, had, for critical theorists, to be analyzed in its own respect and as a non-economically reducible form of expression of human rationality. Such a revision of Marxian categories became extremely crucial, then, in the reinterpretation of the notion of dialectic for the analysis of capitalism."

2.3.1.9. The primary tasks of the Critical Social Theory are to explore:

- (i) Relation between 'theory and practice' and (cf.2.3.2.)
- (ii) Criticism of 'Ideologies, (cf.2.3.3.)

2.3.1.10. 'Ideology' in the Critical theory comprises, 'discursive' and 'non-discursive' elements and defined based on 'biological and quasi-biological properties' or, the 'cultural or socio-cultural features' of the group. [Gauss, 1981, 4]. Further, 'In addition to propositional contents or performatives, it includes 'gesture', ceremonies' etc, [Gauss, 1981, 6-8]. In addition, 'Ideology' is considered to be a conceptualized scheme of a set of belief depicting the worldview, or some paradigm'.

2.3.1.11. "In some cases, when viewed from epistemic or functional or generic point of view, ideology is judged negatively also". [Gauss, 1981, 13].

2.3.1.12. When "ideology" is taken in a positive sense, then it is considered with a "*desideratum*", a "*verité a faire*" (Geuss 1981, p. 23).

2.3.1.13. Critical Theory, contrary to 'the methods of objectified knowledge', 'serves the purpose of human emancipation (cf. 2.3.1.7.) through self-reflection and consciousness'. See also (cf.2.2.11.7. to 2.2.11.15)

2.3.1.14. 'Wrong rationalizations of present and past injustices' are unmasked by the Critical theory through ideological criticism, (cf.2.3.1.), which is used to propose alternate ways for constructing social bound.'

2.3.1.15. Theory and practice, (cf.2.3.2), are the two ends between which the Critical theory works. "It is therefore neither a pure science in the sense of Marx nor a philosophy'. In fact, it is an analytical method to 'clarify socio-political determinants of certain philosophical views', and of transcending the use of 'imagination".

2.3.1.16. Alternate ways of social bonds and causations in the society are established through ideological criticism.

2.3.1.17. Critical theory takes rationality (cf.2.3.3.), in two ways:

- (i) As a 'dominant form of power deprived of any normative force' and
- (ii) As a 'liberating force based on yet to come scenario.'

According to Habermas, there are two types of rationality. One, 'instrumental rationality', which is related to means-end understanding of humans and the second, the 'communicative rationality' in which human action is subordinated to certain normative criteria.'

2.3.1.18. 'Critical Theory gives rise a form of knowledge after analysis and criticism of some "falsity of conscience". [Geuss 1981, 26]. It forms a ground for Critical theorists and philologists while dealing with *paramArthika* in Sanskrit. Such an analysis leads to two notions, "true and false interests", which can be separated by two approaches, one, 'perfect knowledge approach' and second, optimal condition approach [Geuss, 1981, 48].'

Let us sum up this characterization of the Critical theory with what Corradetti, [2016], puts as, "The mission of the Critical theory, which started from Marxism, is not exhausted by a theoretical understanding of the social reality... there is a strict interconnection between critical understanding and transformative action: Theory and Practice are interconnected." which we take up below.

2.3.2. The Theory and Practice Problem

In one of his early papers, Sheldon Pollock [1985] raises the theory and practice problem in Indian knowledge system, especially *SAstra*, the methodological background of which can be traced back to the Theory and Practice problem of the Critical theory, in which Theory and Practice are interconnected and the Critical theorists have proposed various solutions to the problem. 'To understand the problem we may approach David Hume's "is/ought" to question, in other words, 'what is there' and 'what it should or ought to be', to put it in another way'.

2.3.2.1. Traditionally, there have been two approaches to study the Theory and Practice:

- (i) A cognitive approach to validation of a moral statement,
- (ii) A non-cognitive approach where no truth validity is defended

2.3.2.2. Two more grounds were added to it by the Critical theory:

- (i) 'Anthropological', where the 'transcendental argument is combined to it with argument that 'humans have 'interest', (cf. 2.3.1.10; 2.3.1.18.), in knowledge so long as it is meant to preservation of 'Self-Identity and then, to preserve one's self-identity, humans go beyond, 'mere compliance with 'biological survival', [Habermas, 1968] (in Ingram and Simon Ingram, 1992.263) and
- (ii) psychological' (cf. 2.3.2.8.).

2.3.2.3. Criticizing the non-cognitive arguments, Habermas writes, "knowledge is thus grounded into the practical domain, 'interest' and is reflected into self-reflection, i.e., 'knowledge for the sake of knowledge'", [Habermas, 1968] in (in Ingram and Simon Ingram, 1992.263).

2.3.2.4. Thus, 'Critical theory rejects the non-cognitive approach "as it cannot provide justifications for the difference between the norm-guided 'convergent behavior' and the "reason" behind 'following a valid rule or norm' validity of which may require an extra layer of justification of the norm being followed. Habermas's arguments strengthen criticism of 'positivism and of the 'epistemic status of knowledge.'

2.3.2.5. Habermas uses 'counter-factual to establish his arguments.'

2.3.2.6. To Critical theory there can be no 'objective knowledge' as defined by positivists, independent of the 'inter-subjective forms of understanding',

2.3.2.7. It is important to note that in the Critical theory and hence philology, 'knowledge is strictly embedded in serving human interests,' therefore it cannot be considered as 'value-neutral' and 'objectively independent'. (cf.2.2.11.0.).

2.3.2.8. The 'psychological' aspect of the theory/practice makes use of 'psychoanalysis' "where is and ought are strictly separated and an attempt is made to 'unmask false 'ought' by psychoanalysis to clarify the mechanism of constructing 'desires'. The greatest philosophical role of psychoanalysis in Frankfurt School led to the interpretation of 'interest genealogy'.

1.3.2.9 "To explicate 'tension between nature and culture' and Fromin's 'total shaping of 'natural instincts', Marcuse introduced a perspective 'where instincts are only partially shaped by social relations'. [Ingram, 1990]. "Through such a solution, Marcuse overcame the strict opposition between biological and historical rationality preventing the resolution of the theory/practice problem."

2.3.2.10. 'To hide their unresolved 'tensions' Individuals use 'Imagination', to reconcile with social realities, through 'aestheticization' of basic instincts liberated through imagination. Due to 'excessive reliance on human biology, however, made Marcuse's prescription problematic since 'it became impossible to distinguish between truth and falsity of socially dependent needs.'

2.3.3. The Idea of Rationality: Critical Theory and its Discontents

Rationality lies at the heart of scientific methods, be it the methods in social sciences, or theoretical or mathematical sciences or natural sciences.

2.2.3.1. The Critical theory considers rationality to be a 'historical' process and 'the unity of rationality and the historical process' was taken as a "precondition for social criticism". Later on, under the influence of post-modernity, this unity got broken as the Critical theory has gone several internal and external 'reformulations' and criticisms. Suggestions came forward to include inquiry in pre-linguistic line by Habermas, emphasizing 'authenticity' and 'imagination'." [Corradetti, 2016]

2.3.3.2. Corradetti summarizes the evolution of Critical theory as, "the commitment of Critical Theory to universal validity and universal pragmatics has been widely criticized by post-structuralists and postmodernists who have instead insisted respectively on the hyper-contextualism of the forms of linguistic rationality, as well as on the substitution of a criticism of ideology with genealogical criticism. While Derrida's "deconstructive method" has shown how binary opposition collapses when applied to the semantic level, so that meaning can only be contextually constructed, Foucault oriented his criticisms to the supposedly "emancipatory" power of universal reason by showing how forms of domination permeate micro-levels of power-control such as in sanatoriums, educational and religious bodies and so on. The control of life - known as bio-power - manifests itself in the attempt of "normalizing" and constraining individuals' behaviors and psychic lives. For Foucault, reason is embedded into such practices, which display in their turn the multiple layers of force. The activity of the analyst in this sense is not far from the same activity of the participant: there is no objective perspective, which can be defended. Derrida, for instance, while pointing to the Habermasian idea of pragmatic communication, still avoids any overlapping by defending the thesis of a restless deconstructive potential of any constructing activity, so that neither unavoidable pragmatic presuppositions nor idealizing conditions of communication can

survive deconstruction. On the other hand, Habermasian “theory of communicative action and discourse ethics”, while remaining sensitive to contexts, defends transcendental conditions of discourse, which, if violated, lead to a performative contradiction. To the Habermasian role of “consensus” or “agreement” in discursive models, Foucault objected that rather than a “regulatory” principle, a true “critical” approach would simply command to “non-consensuality,” [Corradetti, 2016].” What is worth noting is that the principle of the “right to justification” provokes echoes across both the analytic and the Critical Theory domain. It seems therefore that the new challenge Critical Theory is today facing consists precisely in detecting key concepts at the crossroads of both the Anglo-Saxon and the Continental tradition.” [Corradetti, 2016]

2.3.4. Post-Structuralism, Critical Theory and beyond

Under the influence of the Structuralism, a Critical theory developed into a truly interdisciplinary methodology and culminated into "The Critical Theory". In structuralism, Levi Straus pointed that there were binary structures in myth, culture, and language. The idea spread from his anthropological studies to theories of language and to Marxism. "Texts were seen as a structured network of signs determined through their differential relation to other signs".

2.3.4.1. The post-structuralism challenged the primary status of structuralism and made it an active and creatively capable and took Critical theory away from the more unhistorical, scientific, and objectivist models.

2.3.4.2. Derrida rejected the structuralist theories of language. He stressed, "The instability and excess of meaning in language, as well as the ways that heterogeneity and difference were generated this opened the discipline for more appreciation of philosophy, literature, and less scientific modes of discourse". (Derrida 1977, 278),

2.3.4.3. "Derrida's deconstruction took apart philosophical and closed scientific systems, showing that their foundational beliefs affirmed one side or another of the binary oppositions. Thus, poststructuralism stressed the openness and heterogeneity of the text, in history and desire, its political and ideological dimensions, and its excess of meaning."

2.3.4.4. This led the Critical theory to become a more multilevel interpretive methods and more radical political readings and critique.

2.3.4.5. Foucault observed that in the Western societies, 'the social power may get mediated through philosophy.' In addition, he described the way in which, 'the latent struggle between the social authority and individual reason can turn the reason into a battleground.' [Foucault, 1979]. It is this thread, which Pollock seems to follow as his meta-paradigm.

2.3.4.6. Edward Said, [Said, 1979], articulated the “orientalism” of western-centric ideology and construction of non-western cultures in both colonial and postcolonial discourses.

2.3.4.7. Feminists described how patriarchy and relations of totalitarianism and subordination are inscribed in texts.

2.3.4.8. French theorist Jean Baudrillard 'analyzed the “system of objects” and “political economy of the sign” in the media and consumer society showing how values were organized in a hierarchal system.' He entered a "deconstructive poststructuralist" phase taking apart in sequence the claims of Marxism and political economy, Freud and psychoanalysis, Foucault, and other forms of theory, [Baudrillard, 1996].

2.3.5. Critical Cultural Studies

“Politics of representation”, has been a forceful field of study for the Critical theory in which images, discourses, and narratives, cultural philosophy, sciences, advertising, entertainment, media culture embedded in texts and reproduced social domination and subordination began to be studied. It was from here multiple 'Critical theories began to develop for, for example, feminism, race, gay and lesbian, and others new political movements, making critical theory part of the political struggle. These critical theories also had political motives and gave rise voice to groups and individuals marginalized in the dominant forms of Western and then global culture, which later got a special application in liberation

theological movements and with Pollock's aspiration for Liberation philology, (cf. 3.5.0). Specific Critical theories were developed under the influence of Postcolonial theory as a response to colonial oppression and to the hopes of national liberation. 'Conflicting models of the critical theory are being utilized by different individuals and groups in various fields of inquiry in different parts of the world. There is also a tendency to combine critical theories in one's work, following Foucault', [Foucault, Michel.1979]. There has also been an anti-theory discourse due to Rorty, Richard, [Rorty, 1989] and 'various critics of Theory have called for rigorous empirical and contextual engagement with it.' The critical theory now is a multidisciplinary, multidimensional term that continues to take on differing connotations and uses, applied to many different disciplines and debates in the contemporary moment.

The most important fact is that "there is no single critical theory that can deal with multiple trajectories and dimensions." It now combines social theory, cultural and political commentary, philosophy, literary stylistics, and many social and human sciences in their work, crossing boundaries between academic disciplines and fields. "This interdisciplinary focus links French Critical theory to Frankfurt School Critical theory" and hence the "Theory" replaces philosophy as the most abstract and general mode of theoretical discourse and has emerged as an autonomous enterprise in itself"

This summary has been just an introduction to the basic concepts. Literature under Critical Theory is generally very dense in reading and interpretation, as we find in Pollock's writings. A sound understanding of the contemporary Critical Theory is necessary.

3.0.0. Pollock's Methodologies

The conceptual summaries given in the last section were meant for the background. Now we take up the flagship methodology of Prof. Sheldon Pollock, the Philology. It is interesting here to read what Brennan wrote on philology. "Even in an era of the false populism", writes Brennan, "of youth techno-cultures where intellectual dialogue seems dead on arrival, a political riposte of sorts is possible. It will find its resources in the apparently belated idea of "philology" – not understood as the old hoary science of the 19th-century paleographic text, but a generalist, sociological quest for meanings as intentions. And in fact, philology has found a new popularity recently for just that reason." [Brennan, 2013]. In subsection (cf. 3.3.0.), we will see Philology is a "project", in conformity with the objectives of the Critical theory, with predetermined political intents, predesigned plans to prove predefined conclusions, insinuation, and the establishment of contradictions. Questions need to be raised on the very professional ethics and responsibility of philology itself.

Prof. Pollock's field of the excursion is South East Asia in general and India in particular and the genre space, the "power-culture dynamics". His victimized weapons are Sanskrit, its interpretation, and the Indian Tradition. On occasions, we find Pollock making assumptions and hypotheses for immediate logical completion and forget later. Similarly, he makes many definitions, contradicts or changes them later, nothing to surprise, as we now know the 'non-unique' character of the theories of criticism. (cf. 2.3.5.). Even from a social science point of view, for example, we find methodological '*ad hoc*-ism' in Pollock's choices. He compares cultures without having any specific theory of comparative culture. We find many more issues making his approach susceptible, [Dunkin. 2013]. The conclusions Dunkin draws are worth noting here. He concludes as (i) "When one excavates the pre-colonial Indian data without a theory, the result looks somewhat like Pollock's The Language of the Gods... [Pollock, 2006]. (ii) 'It has seemingly refreshing insights on the Indian past. But, why I say 'seemingly', it is not clear what the importance or the implications of these insights are.' (iii) '...that "[n]o uniform code of law was ever enforced anywhere across caste groupings, let alone everywhere in an imperial polity" [Pollock, 2006: 277]. If this is true, it is possible that castes were never seen as one unit (as a social system, that is), as we so conveniently portray them in the present.' (iv) 'If a uniform code of law was never enforced across caste and an imperial polity, either no restrictions or rules were ever enforced across caste and a 'state' ("imperial polity") or such restrictions were enforced through other modes.(v) 'Pollock fails to see such

implications of his own insight. (vi) 'It looks miraculous that two-thousand-years ago, with the kind of transportation and communication media available at that time, a language was restricted to South Asia to specific castes and purposes.' (vii) '[Pollock, 2006] is full of similar examples where he fails to see the implications of his own insights, and ends up making farfetched claims. And, in this sense, he looks more like a colonial European scholar amazed at the rich material found in India.' [Dunkin. 2013].

In this section, we will focus on Pollock's "front office method", the philology, but before that let us have a look at the notion of 'time' in his paradigm.

3.1. Time, Historicity, and the Indian Knowledge System

From "Vico-Spinoza-Marx-Critical theoretic 'philological project' paradigm" i.e., from Vico (2.1.0), from Marx, (2.2.11.1 to 2.2.11.7) from the Critical theory (2.3.1; 2.3.2.; 2.3.3 and 2.3.5), we now understand how deeply rooted the "historicity" is. It lies at the heart of the Marxism, and hence Critical Theory-Philology Projects Paradigm. To escape from historicity is to escape from the Critical Theory or any of its paradigms chosen to apply. We also know that the Indian knowledge system, based on its own "Cosmic Whole" paradigm, has its own conception of time, [Prasad, 1992] and historicity. Historicity, as taken by Pollock, is like "local analysis" in contrast to "global analysis", in the mathematical sense and his attempt as a literal generalization of conclusions of the part to the whole. Arvind Sharma, [Sharma, .2003], has examined the issue of historicity in India. Pollock [2005] finds the temporality and *aitihAsika* as an "attitude of a-historicity in Indian intellectual tradition problematic since it makes his Critical paradigm inapplicable to Indian tradition. That is why, Pollock, does not ever mention this methodological handicap but gives many other reasons to support his arguments for historicity. He writes, "The unhistorical has historicity, and the cyclical itself presupposes it, (i.e. in the sense of local analysis, as we pointed above, mine), even demonstrating stasis and repetition requires historiography. There is no insuperable contradiction between a historical and a historicist reconstruction of the world less committed to history than the modern West. "Pollock confronted with the "question of Indian intellectual history, and the theories and methods that may be specific to Sanskrit Knowledge System, for a time-space of "late premodern" or "early modern" period (c.1550-1750).' Taking terms in a strictly "chronological" and "value-neutral" sense ..." Pollock is dodging us here methodologically; he claims to be "value -neutral" whereas his own Critical theoretic methodology is in crisis on it, (cf.2.3.2.7. for contradiction to his value -neutral claim while applying the Critical theory). He writes, 'to abandon historical analysis in the name what some emphatically call "difference" would be like abandoning the heliocentric theory of geocentrism ... It is entirely possible for us to learn about premodern processes, even processes involving meaning and historicity, that premodern people did not reflect upon the same way we do today.' [Pollock, 1989]. To him, the assertion of cyclical renewal is in fact 'false generalization' which we can say is same in spirit as Pollock has adopted a wrong paradigm and its inherent methodologies which have been unfit to analyze the literature dealing with "Cosmic whole". Handicapped by his own critical paradigm blindfolded by its conviction that his "partial Universe" covered under his Critical methodological philology covers the "whole Universe", Prof. Sheldon Pollock, no matter what he thinks or writes, is doomed to fail in understanding what exactly our Indian tradition has been communicating. In fact, in Indian tradition, the very notion of the words, "*purANa*" and "*iti-hAsa*", connote something different from West's notion of the "history". He speaks of the whole and the part and tries to implicate the 'Whole system' with the norms of a part, being merely a subsystem, and practically leaving the rest. This creates many serious methodological problems on which we find Prof. Pollock maintaining silence. Space restriction imposes limit here but it can be traced and blown further, (cf. 3.0.0.). Moreover, Pollock not only tries to hijack the "Cosmic Whole" paradigm to the partial, as we have seen above, he tries to readjust without scientific substantiation, the historical dates [Malhotra, 2016, 374], for example, for chronology of key Hindu text, [Malhotra, 2016, 390], for chronology adjusted for Buddhism, [Malhotra, 2016, 125] for Using Buddhism as a wedge for secularizing Sanskrit and [Malhotra, 2016, 227,228].

3.2.1. Philology

Pollock's methodology is Philology for which he writes, "Over the past two centuries", writes Pollock, (2015, b. 114), "an impressive body of Western scholarship has been produced exploring the structure of this intricate and sophisticated system of language analysis. What is astonishing, however, even to specialists in the field, is "how little scholarship we possess— at least scholarship that is historically deep, systematically ordered, and conceptually rich— on the other traditional Indian forms of language-and- text analysis, beyond the phonology and morphology constituting the sphere of traditional grammar, that take us into domains we would include under any reasonable definition of philology— one that demands, not a specific set of methodological or theoretical features invariable across all time and space, but the broader concern with making sense of texts." What a lofty ambition, aiming to make sense from a text, beyond the phonology involved in reading, beyond its morphology, beyond its grammar, and hence beyond its semantics. Worth noting here is that Pollock does not include "beyond any ideology", beyond political" which becomes crucial indeed, see as we will see in (cf. 3.4.0) below. Interestingly, however, while pleading for philology before the American Universities recently, Pollock has confessed as, " As for philology... its contemporary form is generally un-theoretical, un-modern, un-trans, and un-cool, it has now been buried at the bottom of the... [Pollock. 2015],"

The fact is that, given the present state of Philology, as in the critical theory, (cf.2.3.5.), there is no single "correct" method of text-analysis, but many methods, with the possibility of complete inconsistency in drawing conclusions and interpretations. Having such characterization, certain finer points need to be summarized for ease in their applicability. That is why Pollock says,

3.2.2. "What I offer instead as a "rough-and-ready working definition", It is not the theory of language—that's linguistics— or the theory of meaning or truth—that's philosophy—but the 'theory of textuality as well as the history of textualized meaning." [Pollock, 2009].

3.2.3 Ideally, "Philology" is a branch of scientific methodology, to be taken in the broadest sense, which provides analytics for the critical and historical interpretation of texts so it can be applied technically to any text, especially dealing with human aspect. For a recent survey, see [Turner, 2014].

3.2.4. To Pollock, it is clear that the scientific practice of philology cannot help but assures a conviction it will take one to 'the deeper meaning' of the text, if not to the 'only true meaning'.

3.2.5. While applying philology to a text for interpretation, Pollock delineates three sets of meanings, (i) author's meaning, (ii) tradition's meaning, (iii) textual meaning as recognized by the reader, i.e., contextual meaning, philologists' meaning. Of these, it is the philologist's "historical reading" of the text for meaning is philology.

3.2.6. 'These three dimensions of meaning may or may not be mutually compatible. Pollock takes a "broad 'pragmatic' view", so allowing himself further liberty and discretionary power, on the question of truth or 'true meaning'.'

3.2.7. Philology has to work within this triadic structure of meaning. "Between the historicist and the presentist meaning, is the traditional meaning. The tradition is another kind of 'true meaning' for Pollock, none of these interpretations is false since 'all interpretations are embodiments of 'human consciousness' called into being by certain properties of the text and it cannot be called correct or incorrect in their historical existence.(cf. 2.2.11.2; 2.2.11.10 to 1.2.11.12.)

3.2.8. The most important fact is that philology "*embodies a kind of program*". [Pollock, 2009]. (cf. 2.3.0. 2.3.2.9, 2.3.2.10. and 3.3.0.)

3.2.9. As in the Critical theory, "the theory and method in philology are generally inseparable.'

3.2.10. 'Philology is by nature multidimensional like the human affairs, performing through the critical theory, so it is 'pluralistic'. Critical techniques act through textual analysis and are, thereby capable of finely dissecting the various dimensions and underlying causal chains of the in the processes.'

3.2.11. "There is potentially no trans-historical dimension to the meaning of any historical text. This makes a present of the philologist irrelevant as far as the meaning of the text is concerned and hence the text is itself assumed to be outside of 'history'. The present of the philologist is, in fact, the third of the

three sources of meanings that together constitute philology. To him, the presentist reading is our own meaning of the text." [Jha, 2014].

3.2.12. Pollock "does not reject the historicist meaning".

3.2.13. Pollock uses Gadamer's conception of 'application' in the hermeneutic process to elucidate this presentist dimension of meaning. In his *Truth and Method*, Gadamer writes the following conclusion: "Thus there is undoubtedly no understanding that is free from all prejudices, however much the will of our knowledge must be directed toward escaping their thrall. Throughout our investigation, it has emerged that the certainty achieved by using scientific methods does not suffice to guarantee truth. This especially applies to the human sciences, but it does not mean that they are less scientific; on the contrary, it justifies the claim to the special human significance that they have always made. The fact that in such knowledge the knowers own coming into play certainly shows the limits of the method, but not of science. Rather, what the tool of the method does not achieve—must—and really can—be achieved by a discipline of questioning and inquiring, a discipline that guarantees truth. [Gadamer, 1996]."

3.2.14. Pollock tries to use Spinoza's philology along with Vico, [Pollock, 2015, b], for a post-capitalist philology with a kind of new species consciousness, however, writes as usual, that both Vico and Spinoza are right and wrong at once. (cf. 3.4.0.).

3.2.15. We need a global, pluralist philology, he demands, (without giving due attention to the limitations of the paradigm as defined in this paper.)

3.2.16. There is an inherent tension, contradiction (cf. 2.2.10.4; 2.2.10.5.; Hume's is/ought problem or theory/practice problem of Critical Theory, cf. 2.3.2.) in his scheme of scientific, pluralist philology. On one hand, Pollock states that the kind of meaning of a text we accept depends on the context and on the 'use' those we are going to make of this text. Contrary to the practical problem of non-uniqueness of the solution in the Critical paradigm, he admits that there is always the idea of 'the true meaning' guiding the scientific labors of philology. (cf. 2.3.1; 2.3.3.; 2.2.10.0; and 2.2.11.0.)

3.2.17. There are some additional tensions in Pollock's philological scheme, as pointed out by [Jha, 2014]. He writes, "But there is an inherent tension in his scheme of scientific, pluralist philology such as", (a) 'The historicist conviction of access to a meaning is located in the 'present' of the researcher, significantly constituted by a tradition of scientific philology.' (b) 'It is because the researcher is approaching its subject, the text, from within a research tradition, and seeks to discover that 'text' of the real which is beyond all culturally produced texts. (c) 'In Pollock's scheme, just as in the scientific tradition itself, the tradition of inquiry to which researcher himself or herself belongs, becomes invisible. This tradition regards itself as 'non-traditional' or 'anti-traditional'. (d) 'A knowledge tradition marks the presence of an 'absolute meaning', in the form of a set of practices or a form of life. Therefore, while Pollock rejects the historicist philology's exemption of itself from being 'in history', he does not note its exemption from tradition.' (e) 'Texts are traces of knowledge traditions. In fact, a text is the intersection of several knowledge traditions. For example, a text of Buddhist philosophy will be part of textual, literary, philosophical, meditational traditions.' (f) 'How a text is understood in a tradition depends on how the text is 'used' or read, or which is the same thing, how the text is 'read' in that tradition.' (g) 'If one wants to relate a text to a context outside of it, the first step is to look at how the text is used or read. This knowledge of how the text is 'used' does not come from the knowledge of the text. It can only come from the knowledge of the tradition to which that text belongs.' (h) 'When a philologist reads a text from a distant past culture, we can say that two knowledge traditions are potentially in contact. But we cannot know the knowledge tradition only by our reading the text; we will have to know how the text was used and why it was so used.' (i) 'In newer translations of texts from Indian philosophical tradition, there is a move away from 'philological' to more 'philosophical' translations."

3.3.0. Deconstructing a Philology Project

It is necessary for us to deconstruct a philological project and its derived conclusions, to see if there is something else behind the curtain. Two examples are given below which disclose the hidden acts, activities, and intent behind the drama. What follows in this section is based on Reinhold Grünendahl's

'Post-Philological Gestures', [Grünendahl, 2010]. As pointed above our aim is to look into what is behind the curtain in the philological drama of making 'sense'. Since what is to come up in this section below may be disturbing to few, in order to eliminate even a single allegation for misrepresentation or misinterpretation, I have preferred direct quotes from the said article. It is synoptic here and paper can be referred to for details. On what is philology he quotes Bernard Cerquiglini in *Praise of the Variant*, [Cerquiglini, 1999, 49], which claimed to be a "Critical History of Philology". Cerquiglini defines philology as:

3.3.1. "Philology is a bourgeois, paternalist, and hygienist system of thought about the family; it cherishes filiation, tracks down adulterers, and is afraid of contamination. Its thought is based on what is wrong (*the variant being a form of deviant behavior*), and it is the basis for a positive methodology."

3.3.2. The peer response to Cerquiglini book may or may not have been positive but, as Grünendahl writes, "What has been considered most "critical" about it is the "degree of its selectiveness", [Keith, (ed.).1993. 31], his stance can be assumed to have gone down well with the numerous schools of contemporary "Critical theory" that hark back to Foucault, be it directly, or indirectly, for instance, via Edward Said's *Orientalism*?"

3.3.3. Out of philological responsibilities of textual editing, textual criticism, amending, reading etc., [Grünendahl, 2010] begins with 'recent charges against Textual criticism in Indology and cites Peter van der Veer, [van der Veer, 2000], for intentional "hierarchization" in dealing with postcolonial assertion that,'

" [the] 'philological project' of editing Hindu texts (...) is a construction of a Sanskrit canon that privileges a "classical age" before A.D. 1200 and marginalizes or ignores (...) literature written in modern Indian languages, such as Tamil, Bengali, or Urdu"

3.3.4 On. "The term "philological project": it presupposes an unwarranted degree of "political" intentionality and consensus among philologists, be it of the "paternalist", "colonialist", or "nationalist" variety."

3.3.5." according to postcolonial theory, to entail "a violent hierarchy, in which one term of the opposition is always dominant". [Ashcroft, et al. 2000. p. 24, quoted]

3.3.6. Probably the most important observation put forth by Grünendahl is, "It certainly does not provide for the possibility that philology 'could have a purpose in itself' apart from supposedly serving master plans of another order", points [Grünendahl, 2010].

3.3.7. And then he writes "... it would be futile to exhaust oneself in the tedious correction of factual errors and distortions, because the postcolonial charge gathers its momentum outside the sphere of prosaic factuality, preferably by means of subtle insinuation".

The two examples given below are from the same source, show the "intentionality", and "insinuation" in the philological projects.

3.3.8. *Example 1.*

'The postcolonial *leitmotif* "hierarchization" manifests itself in Peter van der Veer, [van der Veer, 2000] and, [Sugirtharajah, 2003]. He applies their stance such that,

(i).' That "MaxMüller accorded a *privileged* position to the Sanskrit Rig-Veda while ignoring the "Tamil Veda";

(ii).' That he had *privileged* the written word and marginalized oral tradition;' and

(iii). that he had *privileged* the Veda, "thus delegitimizing other textual and oral forms of knowledge", They try to show "a violent hierarchy", under the postcolonial theory, "in which one term of the opposition is always dominant". [Ashcroft, 2000. 24, quoted].

3.3.9. Further, van der Veer maintains that "all philological gestures, we may glimpse the nationalist gesture," and "insinuates a connection between the colonial, textualizing project of modernity and a supposed Romantic German search for self-definition."

3.3.10. Example 2.

To illustrate another "philology project", we summarize another example from [Grünendahl, 2010]. Peter van der Veer "creates an impression" that, "the *search for the "golden age of Indo-European civilization in Sanskrit Urtexts fed into a larger discourse of nationalism*, in which Indian philologists like Vishnu Sitaram Sukthankar, first editor in chief of the Mahābhārata, "used philology in the way the Germans used it in their own country".

(...) *Sanskrit philology provided [Indian philologists] with the tools to dig up the origin and essence of the nation, that is, the Hindu nation.*"

And that, "they constructed a Hindu nationalist "imaginary", a selective archive of India's past"... and thus "the critical edition of India's historical landscape, which reached a high pitch in the (...) destruction of Babar's Mosque in Ayodhya, is the site of struggle, the site of difference."

We can see how prejudiced and unscientific are the 'philological projects', biased in textual critical history and interpretation, where the creation of a critical edition of Mahabharata is corroborated to be behind the demolition of mosque structure on the disputed site of *Rama janma bhumi*.

3.3.11. Observations made by Grünendahl on Critical Theory-Philology Project

"To be sure, none of these post-philological arguments are really to the point, but that is as close as the critical theorist gets to the real thing. The basic misunderstanding that usually prevents an adequate assessment is the notion that textual criticism is about extracting a certain *meaning* from a text, while textual critics tend to follow the rule that questions concerning the meaning of a given text had better be postponed until its *wording* has been established as accurately as its textual tradition allows. Thus, van der Veer tries to discredit the critical edition of the Mahābhārata not by pointing out editorial shortcomings, but by reading a "political" meaning into Sukthankar's "philological project" that is unwarranted by anything Sukthankar himself has said, and then "contextualizing" it within Hindu nationalism - an equally unwarranted proposition." ,[Grünendahl, 2010].

This is how philology, when taken as a 'philological project' and not in the sense as expressed in (3.3.6), establishes conclusions by making "sense" from the textual history and its interpretation and that is why it is also called as ,*"a cultural technology of colonial rule"*. [Bernard, 1996, ix, Introduction by Dirks, quoted], approached further by [Anderson, B. 1983] and Michel Foucault's "power axiom" "exposing the secret complicities between power and knowledge", as Said put it, [Said, Foucault. 1997], to name just a few items. 'It is not that all agree to Pollock even at his own place', [Bajohr, H.et.al. (Ed) 2014.1, footnote one]. Grünendahl, points, "Here van der Veer merely emulates Pollock's "Deep Orientalism", the most notorious example of this kind of discourse strategy.

3.3.11. "This brings me to the epistemological level. On the one hand, the postcolonial charge associates the "philological project" with *Realpolitik*. At the same time, by reducing its methodology to mere "gestures", affiliating it to "German Romanticism", and eventually making it part and parcel of "the Hindu nationalist imaginaire", the factual basis of textual criticism is disputed. Its very reality is called into question by little more than the lavish use of inverted commas and words to that effect, such as

"construct", imaginaire, etc. Consequently, the critical theorist can hardly be expected to enter into a detailed discussion of the actual "philological handiwork of critical editions, etymology, historical grammar and the like, because that could be Seen as attributing some substance to them after all — which is incompatible with the epistemological premise that reduces any notion of the factual nature of texts to a mere "religion of the text," as Cerquiglini put it. [Grünendahl, 2010].

3.4.0. Critical Philology

Pollock, [Pollock, 2015, b], suggests developing a Critical Philology. He says, the task of Sanskrit philologists have been to collate sources, survey distribution of texts, frame principles, decide variants, decide the way to read, and access the associated contexts, to settle the belongingness to a tradition. Having seen the two examples above,(3.3.8 to 3.3.10) we can add to the aforesaid list the mode of intentionality, the degree of insinuation, nature of political affiliation and religious and ideological presuppositions and other points of inclinations to complete the list of responsibilities of a philologist. How can we forget that they are free from normative bounds of any type of professional ethics under the Critical theory paradigm and free to "create" a theory to suit their own agenda and objective? No objection can be raised as Pollock himself says 'all interpretations are correct'. In above article he says, "We are only beginning to understand any of these concerns in a general way, and their particulars, *a fortiori*, await serious attention, viewed both synchronically (what precisely were the stable norms?) And diachronically (what changed over time?)." with the following questions like, which are yet to be considered by philologists. He writes, " More than ever before, ..., two genres of text, *kāvya* and *Veda*, both culturally central, came to be mediated by a philological apparatus that with growing sophistication emphasized the need for careful recension, the dynamic changeability of transmission (at least for secular texts), the requirement of purification, and the systematicity of reading, an apparatus whose growing density and broad distribution bespeak new pedagogical needs and possibly new reading publics." see. [Pollock, 2015, b].

Pollock looks forward to expanding philology to make it global and pluralistic, however, he says nothing on the biases, as we have seen in the mode of intentionality, the degree of insinuation, nature of political affiliation and religious and ideological presuppositions and other points of inclinations inducing unscientific attitudes. He writes further, "Beyond such historical and comparative matters, little understood at present but important for a global history of philology, there is a discipline-theoretical problem that needs attention".

3.5.0 from Liberation Theology to Liberation Philology

In his Delhi lecture, [Pollock, 2012], Pollock tried to explore a bi-directional interaction between Philology and the Society in such a way that the world shapes philological concerns and practices and in turn philological concerns and practices shape the world. In his lecture Pollock addressed, three issues:

3.5.1 "Balancing the claims of the inside and the outside of the text;

3.5.2. A concern over past wrongs with a concern for future rights; i.e. supplementing post-colonialism with post-capitalism, and

3.5.3. Finding a way to meet, from our small philological locations as specific intellectuals, the obligation to construct "a planet-wide inclusivist community".

Three together lead to what Pollock calls the "liberation philology", but we can, after seeing, (3.3.8 to 3.3.10) call it the "Liberation Philology project". This signifies a process of textual analysis, interpretation, and making "sense". As we know the Critical theory aims to achieve its objective through political movements, the liberation philology aims it by becoming an active part of the power-culture dynamics becomes capable of correcting not only wrongs of the past but the future also, as imagined by the philologist, (cf. 3.3.0 to 3.3.10). It aims is to reconstruct the future through the culture - power

dynamics, in the line of the "liberation theology", thereby being capable enough to transform the existing social structure to a more 'inclusive' one.

Understanding of the social mechanism underlying the liberation philology is very important for reconstruction and for its deconstruction. Clarifying the "Marxian-socio-cultural-theological process" in the Liberation Theology, Michael Löwy, writes, "We observe that the discovery of Marxism by progressive Christians and liberation theology was not a purely intellectual or academic process. It goes through actual changes in modes of production in the society and therefore, actual glimpses may help but then it must be kept in mind that the examples given as episodes represent some specific location, space, and time, as here it is Latin America.". He points, it "is the expression of a vast social movement, which emerged at the beginning of the 1960s, well before the new works of theology. This movement involved considerable sectors of the Church (priests, religious orders, and bishops), lay religious movements (Catholic Action, the Christian student movement, Christian young workers), pastoral committees with a popular base, labor, land and urban pastoral committees, and ecclesiastical base communities. Without the practice of this social movement, which might be called a Christianity of liberation, one cannot understand such important social and historical phenomena in Latin America over the last thirty years as the rise of revolution in Central America – Nicaragua and El Salvador – or the emergence of a new working-class and peasant movement in Brazil (the Workers' Party, the Landless Peasants' Movement, etc.". He writes further, "Liberation theologians – and 'liberation Christians' in the broad sense – do not limit themselves to using existing Marxist sources. In the light of their religious culture, but also their social experience, they break new ground and reformulate certain basic themes of Marxism. In this sense, they may be regarded as 'neo-Marxists' – that is to say, as innovators who offer Marxism a new inflection or novel perspectives, or make original contributions to it." [Löwy, 2006].

The idea behind (3.5.2. and 3.5.3), above can be understood by thinking in analogous to what has been known as the liberation theology. Like Frankfurt School's Critical theory, liberation theology too had the Marxism as its basis, especially Neo-Marxism, combined with adjusted Christianity and modified Church directives due to its failure in meeting basic needs of the society, administered through intellectual-social-power dynamics. The 'inclusive' above, presupposes exclusion by contradiction, which has been inherent in the social system by presupposition. (cf. 2.1.0. and 2.2.0) and one cannot transcend the paradigm here too, as it has been in the case of Critical theory. We find Pollock's ambition to be notoriously high, the complete liberating transformation of the social and culture-power structure through political philology, making his entire literary-cultural endeavor a Grand Political Program for the Global stage.

4.0.0. The Critical Theory-Philology Project-Paradigm and the Sanskrit Knowledge System

Having introduced ourselves to the 'Vico-Spinoza-Marx-Critical Theory-Philology Project-Paradigm' and some of their uses and abuses of philology, it is now time to consider Sanskrit. In the section we will not plunge into what Pollock calls Sanskrit Cosmopolis, orientalism, vernacularization, or grammaticization etc, as we know these post interpretation theorizations, thereby needing little reconsideration of the foundations of the paradigm with which first steps were taken while making interpretations. We will focus on what how the paradigm adopted by Pollock to be able to ascertain if the choice of the paradigm adopted to interpret Sanskrit by Pollock really is correct and if not how to correct it.

To begin let us a thread from a lecture delivered by Pollock himself, 'The Ends of Man at the End of Premodernity'. Twelfth Gonda Lecture, Dec.3rd, 2004, Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences. Amsterdam. [Pollock, 2005]. However, before that, let us see what Jan Gonda himself has said. He writes, " ... who take cognizance of the moot points and questions under discussion among Vedic and historians of Indian thought will have noticed that our knowledge of, and insight into Vedic religion largely depends on a correct understanding of a considerable number of Indian words and phrases, many of which have now been debated for nearly a century. They will have observed that rarely opinions on the exact sense of important religious terms continue to diverge widely, and in other cases, solutions offered with much self-confidence and suggestiveness appear to be, sooner or later, open to justifiable criticism."

[Gonda, 1962, 243-73]. On which Pollock says in his aforesaid Gonda Memorial lecture, "This kind of care for detail - this artisanal mastery- does tend to focus the mind ... did not take much to convince me that this mode of inquiry is an absolutely necessary condition of our disciplinary practice." [Pollock, 2005]. "We can write this intellectual history (cf. 3.1.0) because there is a history to Sanskrit intellection." He says further, "...we can write a history of Sanskrit learning in the 'late premodern,' or 'early modern,' period (c.1550-1750) - taking these terms for the moment in a strictly chronological and "value-neutral sense "as virtually synonymous with pre-colonial, and thereby suspending judgment about these centuries as ..." We have seen, however, that "value neutrality" is not possible in the Critical theory (cf.2.3.2.7) and hence philology, where the latter is a "project", (cf. 3.3.3.to 3.3.6) as we now know, with specific value bias and intent for insinuation.(cf. 3.3.4 to 3.3.7). The most important task before us is to examine if the nature of analytical tools in Pollock's writings are suitable enough to analyze the Sanskrit, both, its texts as well as the ideologies it carries. From, (cf. 2.1.0; 2.2.0.) we know that materialistic shift of Vico (cf. 2.1.0) followed by Marx, (cf. 2.2.0) followed by critical theory (cf.2.3.0) followed by Pollock in his philological exercises we are aware now of its technical foundations.

4.1.0. From 2.2.14.0. We know that the dual yardstick used by the Marxists for literature is.

(i) Aesthetics and Form and

(ii) Historicity.

4.1.1. Now, the reason behind Pollock's emphasis on the aesthetics, form (of the text) and its historicity while dealing with Sanskrit texts under critical theory paradigm can now well be understood. The question is what does, both aesthetic and historical, signify to Sanskrit? For, we consider here D.D.Kosambi. A mathematician by profession and training but a Marxist by persuasion, and a Sanskrit's. Why choose Kosambi to show the Marxist interpretation of Sanskrit? It is well justified as we know about his critical editions of Bhartṛhari's Śatakātaya and Subhāṣitaratnaḥa won him unqualified approval from Sanskritists all over the world. He was a co-translator of Beās's play, Avimāra. His highly influential but controversial two books on Indian history, [Kosambi 1975] and [Kosambi 1972]. For further support see, [Pollock, 2008; Thapar, 2016; Goldman, 2016; Chakrabarty, 2016]. Kosambi divided Sanskrit into prose *śāstra*, for facts and poetry *kāvya* for creativity, and gave weight to the latter, the same has been followed by Sheldon Pollock [Pollock,2005] also based on the "science of imagination" of Vico, (cf. 2.1.0) and the power to communicate, an attribute so significant in the Critical theory.

As a Marxist, Kosambi was very critical of the continuation of Sanskrit in India even after the rise of local vernaculars. In his overall view of Sanskrit literature, Sanskrit was just a complimentary. He writes, "At its best, Sanskrit literature is exquisite, with an intricate pattern of beauty. Even at its best, it does not give the depth, simplicity of expression, the grandeur of spirit, the real greatness of humanity that one finds in the Pali Dhammapada, Dante is the Divine Comedy or Bunyan's Pilgrim's Progress. It is the literature of and for a class, not a people." [Kosambi, 1975, 283].

What makes Kosambi's judgment of Sanskrit literature as a whole so significant is his distinct point of view. It may be encapsulated in a single sentence: does the work in question reflect, or at least show acquaintance with common people and women and their way of life? Kosambi viewed history too in the same light. "There is no need to dig into the Gītā or the Bible for an ethical system sandwiched with superstition. Such books can still be enjoyed for their aesthetic value" [Kosambi 1962, 37]. He, [Kosambi, 1975, 282], praises Patañjali's Mahābhāṣya, not only for its intrinsic merit but also for the fact that it "gains its strength and charm from a wealth of references to common life", Śūdraka is praised for the Prakrit with "provincial variations" that seems to be modeled upon life [Kosambi 1972, 202]. Although the life of Harṣa is, generally speaking, useless to the historians, Kosambi [1972, 203] notes, "It contains priceless descriptions, as of the misery, panic, and havoc caused by the devastating march of a friendly army through its own territory".

As a Marxist, being against Indian transcendentalism, idealism, and metaphysics, Kosambi has no sympathy for the “divine but rather scrambled message” of the Gītā. He declares: The incongruities of the Gītā are entirely “in the Indian character”; but the Indian character was not fully set in its familiar mold until the feudal period. When gunpowder had blown Arjuna’s bow and later feudalism off the map, the Indian intellectual still turned instinctively to the Gītā to find some way of coping with patriotic needs in the new world of ...”[Kosambi. 1972, 209]. He says, the merciless class analysis of the whole of Sanskrit literature need not affect the aesthetic appeal of particular works. Artisanry too may very well be prized in its own terms without prejudice. This is why Kosambi could declare with impunity: “We do not dismiss great writing because it is class literature” [Kosambi, 1957] and that is why Kosambi could and did find many Sanskrit works both historically significant and aesthetically satisfying as Marx and Engels, and their adherents like Georg Lukács and George Thomson, found in classical Greek literature. It is just a glimpse of a Marxist's view towards Sanskrit.

4.1.2. In the same line of action Pollock organizes his exploration in Sanskrit around *purushArtha*, [Pollock, 2005], but before we proceed we must have in our mind that our tradition has always been for the "cosmic whole". Western Indologists fail miserably in 'accommodating' the Indian notion of 'transcendence' as defined by a vision of the cosmic whole, into their critical theoretic paradigm for various reasons we are already familiar by now. Their notion of 'transcendence' and the "consciousness" are grounded in social cognition (cf. 2.3.2.1 to 2.3.2.4), as adopted in "Vico-Spinoza-Marx-Critical theoretic 'philological project' paradigm". From Vico (2.1.0), from Marx, (2.2.11.1 to 2.2.11.7), from the Critical theory (2.3.1; 2.3.3; 2.3.5.) and from (2.3.2) we know that the Indian idealist notion of "transcendence" has been assumed away. The transcendence and consciousness which the critical theory or West talks under various "Neo" religious and political creations, say, for example, the liberation theology, (cf. 3.5.0), are determined by the socio-cultural forces in the society and the words certainly misrepresent related Indian notions. From Marxist Dialectical-Historical Materialism (cf. 2.2.0. to 2.2.12.) and its assimilation into the foundation of Critical Theory (cf. 2.3.1) and subsequent postmodern, poststructuralist developments as summarized, (cf. 2.3.4; 2.3.5), we understand that "historicity" lies at the heart of the Critical paradigm including philology. Based on these observations we note Pollock's cry on the "norm bound *SArstra*", [Pollock, 1985], which, according to him has been a big reason behind the "lack of innovation" in India. However, at the same time, we note that he himself has been bound by the presuppositions of the Critical theories. He himself cannot dare or even imagine to transcend the "notions and acts" prescribed by his Critical theory paradigm. Here we can say, applying his own logic that, presuppositions of the Critical theories have marred the innovative capability of its own practitioners so that they have failed to accommodate vital part of the 'Cosmic Whole' into their Critical theory paradigm.

4.1.3. Pollock organizes his exploration around *purushārtha*

purushārtha = *kāma* + *artha* + *dharma*


Pollock considers *purushārtha* as historically core concept and divides his analysis into *kāma*, *dharma* and *artha* as:

- (i) *kāma*: *alaṅkāra śāstra* and the End of Literary Theory
- (ii) *Dharma*: *mīmāṃsā* and the End of Moral Theory
- (iii) *Artha*: *rāja dharma śāstra* and the End of Political Theory
- (iv) He leaves *moksha* the supreme end aimed to attain through above three ends.

4.1.4. The "truth" is that for reasons and limitations due to foundational presumption and axioms in the Critical - philological paradigm, Prof. Pollock fails to accommodate *moksha*, *being transcendental*, despite being the end aim in the Indian tradition to be attained through above three *ends* the *Kama*, *dharma*, and *artha*. Since Pollock has adopted this paradigm, to escape from it is to escape from the Critical theoretic analytics or any of its paradigm chosen to apply. Pollock sees 'pleasure, power and moral order' in deeply interconnected and immersed in the concept of *purushArtha* and which fits well

into his critical paradigm, however in his own style he says, it has been well explored by Indologists but as he points in the footnote 8 that the history of expansion of three ends to include fourth, *moksha* has been understudied. Amarsimha, (*NAmalingAnuSasana* 2.7.58), of the 5th century, knew it but origin still unclear and Pollock tries to find its origin in *mimAnsA*.

A summary table of the methodological sequence, adopted from [Sati Shankar, 2016, a], is given below.



5.0.0. Way forward

Western Indologists fail miserably in 'accommodating' the Indian notion of 'transcendence' into their critical theoretic paradigm. In fact, they have assumed it away as being non-existent or "unreal". Their notion of 'transcendence' and the "consciousness" are based on the grounds of cognition as adopted in "Vico-Spinoza-Marx-Critical theoretic 'philological project' paradigm". This dismissal of a vital aspect of our traditional paradigm may be due to conceptual handicap, technical limitation or lack of tractability or to the dominance of the leftist ideology or a combination of all these. Examination of these may be undertaken, as challenging research projects, both, by Indian and/or the Western scholars since what is proposed here would lead to methodological innovation, therefore, a careful study, and analysis of the analytics in the Critical Theory- Philology Project- Paradigm keeping of specific texts in mind is needed. All the dimensions of textual criticism and Philological practices need to be faithfully considered so that near correct interpretation of the texts can be reached. It is not being something like the discretionary "making sense", as Pollock seeks to prove his conclusions.

Besides the above, we must endeavor to upgrade and develop our own Indian version of holistic Philology. Prof. V.S. Agarwala gave a fine prescription. He says, "There is only one solution", points Prof. V.S. Agarwala, "to this difficulty. We should now begin to study more closely the explanations of the mystical Vedic terminology offered in the indigenous literature, especially the *Brāhmaṇa* and the *āraṇyakas*, which are replete with interpretational material that has remained useless in the absence of the *ādhyātmika* school of Vedic interpreters. Unfortunately, there are many today who could claim to represent the *Aitiḥāsikas* and *ākhyānvidas* of Yaska, but very few who could say that they are carrying on the torch of the *ādhyātma-vidas* referred to in the Nirukta." [Agarwala, 1939].

For, research design may get help from what Prof. Aklujkar proposed, though discretely, but which can be put together in seamless alignment. He had suggested three main dimensions of direct relevance to the development of Indigenous Philology, grammar, sociolinguistics and the history of ancient Sanskrit literature. [Aklujkar, 1996, 2003, 2004].

For the damage already done to our texts and tradition, I agree with Grünendahl when he says, "... it would be futile to exhaust oneself in the tedious correction of factual errors and distortions, because the postcolonial charge gathers its momentum outside the sphere of prosaic factuality, preferably by means of subtle insinuation, [Grünendahl, 2010]. It is, therefore, better to make a necessary overhaul of our tools and techniques of textual criticism and interpretations and upgrade and develop our own Philology for our own texts.

As for now, unless and until a Philology is developed and made capable enough to assimilate the excluded notions of idealism and transcendence in its true sense, its practitioners must show a little academic honesty, at least, to confess and communicate to their readers that whatever they have been writing, or writing, are the Marxist interpretation of the subject matter. In absence of which, we should owe the responsibility of cautioning the prospective readers and reduce further damages to our tradition.

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